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Against the Standard Solution to the Grandfather Paradox 





1000 time-travelers travel back in time, each with the intention of killing their own infant-self. If 
there is no branching time, then on pain of bringing about a logical contradiction, all must fail. 
But this seems inexplicable: what is to ensure that the time-travelers are stopped? 
For a time, this inexplicability objection was thought to provide evidence that there is something 
incoherent about the possibility of backwards time travel in a universe without branching time. 
There is now near-consensus, however, that the objection has no bite: there is nothing inexplicable 
about the mass failure. Lewis, Sider and Ismael independently argue that since it is built into the 
description of the class of cases considered that the time-travelers must fail – and so we consider 
only unsuccessful attempts – there is no mystery. Smith argues that the absence of possible worlds 
at which auto-infanticide is committed suffices as a complete explanation for the failures. And 
Baron and Colyvan maintain that available causal and logical explanations jointly account for 
everything that needs accounting for.  
I argue that these are wrong. There is remaining, problematic inexplicability. For backwards time 
travel not to lead to logical contradiction, something would need to do logic’s bidding, after all. 
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1. The Puzzle 
 Is backwards time travel metaphysically possible in a universe without branching time? Since 
David Lewis’s seminal (1976), it has been widely accepted that the answer to this question is yes: 
there is nothing incoherent about backwards time travel, even if time is one-dimensional. Here I 
argue that the Lewis-style reply is wrong, and that the problem brought out by the grandfather 
paradox is more serious than generally thought.  
 The Grandfather Paradox refers to the following classic puzzle. If backwards time travel were 
possible, a time traveler could travel back to when her grandfather was very young and kill him well 
before his child, the time traveler’s parent, was conceived. Surely this would be possible: there would 
be nothing, in principle, to stop her. On the other hand, it is clear that it could not be possible. For 
killing her grandfather before he helped conceive her parent would give rise to a contradiction, 
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indeed a host of contradictions: the time traveler both is and is not born, her grandfather both did 
and did not live past childhood, the time traveler both did and did not kill her grandfather when he 
was young (for if she did, then she was never born, in which case she didn’t), etc. So it seems that 
we have two choices: deny that it would be possible for the time traveler to kill her grandfather were 
she to travel back in time, or deny that backwards time travel is possible. But since it seems clear that 
a time traveler could kill her own grandfather, we must deny the possibility of backwards time travel.   
 There are different variations of this objection. Here I focus on a variation that is sometimes 
referred to as the inexplicability objection. To explain the objection, we will need a time traveler, call 
her TimnaOLDER (“TimnaO”, for short). Instead of having TimnaO try to kill her grandfather, she will 
travel back in time to try to kill her own infant self, TimnaYOUNGER (“TimnaY”). When TimnaO steps 
out of her time machine in the past, she finds her helpless younger self alone in a crib. TimnaO is 
highly trained in both Karate and Taekwondo and has a sword, dagger, and fully loaded gun as 
backup. TimnaO attempts to kill the child. What happens? If we suppose for the sake of argument 
that backwards time travel is possible, we will have to accept that although it seems that TimnaO 
should have no problem killing TimnaY, in fact she cannot do so: something will have to go wrong. 
TimnaY will have to survive. Maybe TimnaO becomes squeamish about the idea of creating a logical 
contradiction at the last moment and cannot bring herself to go through with the plan. Maybe she 
slips on a banana peel. Maybe she accidentally kills the wrong child. Whatever happens, TimnaO 
must fail. But this is inexplicable. For there is nothing in place to ensure that she fails. As David 
Lewis puts it, “The forces of logic will not stay [her] hand! No powerful chaperone stands by to 
defend the past from interference.” (1976:149). Of course, coincidences happen. It is certainly 
possible for TimnaO to happen to fail for some fluky reason or other. But coincidences are just that: 
coincidental. What seems inexplicable is that the pertinent causal chain must terminate in her 
failure. 
 The problem becomes more striking still when we consider a scenario in which not merely 
one time traveler, but many – perhaps 1,000 – all travel back in time, each with the intention of 
committing auto-infanticide. Although the conditions are ripe for the time travelers to succeed 
(they are all capable assassins confronting helpless infants), something must go wrong in every 
single case. Not one of the time travelers can succeed in the task. How can this be? There are, it 
seems, two good options for responding to this puzzle. We can try to explain away the (appearance 
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of) inexplicability; or else we can accept that, at the very least, the paradox provides us with 
compelling evidence that there is something incoherent about backwards time travel in a universe 
without branching time (albeit not conclusive proof of its impossibility).  
2. The Standard Solution  
 Lewis (1976) was the first to defend time travel against the inexplicability objection. There 
have since been a number of articles responding to it approximately as he does. The response, which 
is widely accepted as correct, is to take the first option above and deny that there is actually anything 
inexplicable or extraordinary about the fact that something or other will cause each time traveler 
who tries to commit auto-infanticide to fail. And if there is nothing extraordinary about it, then the 
fact that each must fail gives us no reason whatsoever to reject the possibility of backwards time 
travel. 
 But how can there be nothing extraordinary about the fact that every single time traveler 
who tries to commit auto infanticide will fail? How can the appearance of inexplicability be explained 
away? Lewis’s solution is to invoke the fact that ‘can’-claims are context sensitive. In a context in 
which we only consider facts about the time before TimnaO’s attempt on TimnaY’s life – facts, for 
example, about TimnaO’s abilities and opportunities at the time – it will turn out that TimnaO can 
kill TimnaY, where by this it is meant that TimnaO’s killing of TimnaY is compossible with the 
relevant pre-attempt facts. This is a standard way to evaluate a ‘can’-claim, and many of the 1000 
backwards time travelers can kill their younger selves in this sense. It is this sense of ‘can’ that we 
use when we use reasoning like, ‘of course TimnaO can kill TimnaY. The latter is just a helpless infant 
and there’s nothing to stop TimnaO…’ We shift to a different use of ‘can’, however, when we think 
about the killing being logically impossible. In particular, we hold fixed facts like that TimnaY 
survived long enough to become an adult and travel back in time. Once we recognize that we are 
holding these additional facts fixed, the inexplicability vanishes: the fact that Timnao cannot kill 
TimnaY given that TimnaY survived the attempt is no more inexplicable than is the fact that I cannot 
eat a sandwich for lunch tomorrow given that I will eat (only) salad.   
Along similar lines, Jenann Ismael (2003) makes the case for explicability by comparing the 
time traveler scenario, which I dub ‘Auto-Infanticide’, to a scenario in which Ismael tries and fails to 
reach her mother by telephone (call this ‘Telephone’). There is nothing odd or mysterious about the 
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fact that every time Ismael attempts to reach her mother by telephone but fails, there is some causal 
explanation for the failure. It may be unlikely or coincidental for Ismael’s phone call to fail to go 
through; nonetheless, it is expected that each time it does fail, there is an explanation. By attending to 
just those cases (however rare) in which the call does not go through, we selectively attend to just 
those cases in which something or other has caused the phone call attempt to fail.  
 Similarly, Ismael argues, when we consider cases in which there is a time traveler from the 
future – alive and in position to attempt auto-infanticide – we are already considering only cases in 
which that time traveler fails. For “…when we describe a self-defeating causal chain, we sneak in, 
under the guise of the first event, a description of the last which is incompatible with the success of 
the operation as a whole…We consider only unsuccessful cases.” (2003: 308, her emphasis). Timna 
being alive as an adult entails that she survived past her childhood. She has survived any attempts 
made on her life when she was a child, including any made by her older self. And just as it makes 
no difference how many times Ismael tries and fails to call her mother – each time there will be some 
causal explanation of her failure – similarly, each time a time traveler tries (and indeed, fails) to 
commit auto-infanticide, there will be some causal explanation for this failure as well. Finally, just 
as there is nothing spooky or noteworthy about this in the case of Ismael’s failed attempts at mom-
calling, likewise there is nothing spooky or noteworthy about it in the case of the auto-infanticidal 
time travelers, regardless of how weird or coincidental the failure appears each time.1  
3. A Disanalogy? 
While it appears, and indeed is widely accepted, that the puzzle has been solved, I now argue 
that it has not been. Let us suppose that TimnaO’s attempt to kill TimnaY occurs at some particular 
time, t1. I will use “x can[<t1] Φ” to mean that x Φ-ing is compossible with the relevant pre-t1 facts, 
and “x can[∞] Φ” to mean that that x Φ-ing is compossible with all the relevant facts, including facts 
at and after t1. We have, then, the following two claims: 
(i) TimnaO can[<t1] kill TimnaY. 
(ii) TimnaO can[∞] kill TimnaY. 
 
1 Ted Sider (2002) argues similarly. 
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I agree with Lewis that the inexplicability vanishes if (i) is true and (ii) is false. And while I 
agree that (ii) is false, I disagree that (i) is true. TimnaO’s successful killing of TimnaY is not 
compossible with the relevant pre-t1 facts. She must be caused to fail, even when we don’t hold fixed 
facts at or after t1. If that is right, then that something will be in place to cause her to fail (a banana 
peel, a jammed gun, etc.)  remains inexplicable – or so I will argue. I have two premises, then, to 
defend. First, that TimnaO cannot[<t1] kill TimnaY. Second, that if that is right – i.e., if (i) is false – 
then Auto-Infanticide is problematically inexplicable. Here is the plan. In the remainder of this section 
and in §4, I will argue that the effectiveness of the analogy between Auto-Infanticide and cases like 
Telephone depends crucially on (i) being true. That is, Telephone is only explicable because it is the 
case that, given that the call is placed at t1, Ismael can[<t1] reach her mother. In §5 I argue that 
TimnaO cannot[<t1] kill TimnaY, and that we therefore cannot account for the explicability of Auto-
Infanticide in the way that Lewis, Ismael, and Sider do. In §6 and §7 I consider different ways theorists 
have tried to defuse the inexplicability worry, and I argue that they are not successful, either. 
To better understand the explicability of Telephone, it will be helpful to consider an additional 
scenario which is explicable in the way that Telephone is but which, like Auto-Infanticide, involves 
backwards time travel.  
Bicycle:  ErnieO never had a bicycle as a child. He travels back in time, meets his younger self, 
ErnieY, and decides to buy him a bicycle. Since ErnieO did not have a bicycle as a 
child, something or other must cause ErnieO to fail in his task. Indeed, all time 
travelers who did not have bicycles as children will fail if they attempt to travel back 
in time and give their childhood selves bicycles. 
 
 Why is it explicable that something – perhaps something that appears fluky and coincidental 
at the time – will happen to cause the call to not go through each time Ismael tries and fails to reach 
her mother? And why is it explicable that every time traveler who did not have a bicycle as a child 
and who travels back in time and attempts to give his or her younger self a bicycle will fail? 
  There is a feature, shared by Telephone and Bicycle, which, I maintain, accounts for the 
scenarios’ explicability. Here is a first attempt at it. 
Contingent Failure: Although the attempt in question failed, it was the case from a temporal 




 When I say of a non-occurring event that it can occur, or could have occurred, or that its 
nonoccurrence is contingent from the perspective of some time, t, I mean that the event is 
metaphysically compossible with all (or nearly all2) pre-t facts. I specify the temporal perspective from 
which the event can occur to distinguish it from the trivial way in which it cannot occur from the 
perspective of a time after it does not occur. If we hold fixed the fact that Ismael’s call failed, for 
instance, then it is necessary that it did. That is, at all the worlds at which Ismael tries to reach her 
mother and the call does not go through, Ismael’s attempt fails. Similarly, ErnieO fails to give ErnieY a 
bicycle at all worlds at which ErnieY never had a bicycle. But, supposing these failures both occur at 
t1, and holding only pre-t1 facts fixed, neither failure was metaphysically necessary. There are nearby 
possible worlds at which Ismael’s phone call goes through. Likewise, from a temporal perspective 
prior to ErnieO’s failed attempt to give ErnieY a bicycle, it was not metaphysically required that he 
fail. There are nearby possible worlds at which ErnieO tries to give ErnieY a bicycle and succeeds. Of 
course, at these worlds ErnieO does have a bicycle as a child. 
The importance of the contingency of the failure given an appropriate temporal perspective 
is especially clear in examples involving backwards causation. Consider Bicycle again. Ernie did not 
have a bicycle as a child. At first sight it might seem inexplicable that, since he did not have a bicycle, 
if ErnieO were to travel back in time and try to give ErnieY a bicycle, he would have to be caused to 
fail in some way. What is to ensure that he does? It is because of the contingency of his failure that we 
don’t need to answer this question: prior to t1, it is not the case that he has to fail. Nothing needs to 
ensure that it happens. It is just that he contingently (from a pre-t1 perspective) does fail. It is, in part, 
because ErnieO happens to fail at t1 that Ernie never had a bicycle as a child. It would be inexplicable 
if ErnioO had to fail if we didn’t hold fixed anything at or after t1. 
 I will argue in the next section that Auto-Infanticide does not share this feature with the other 
cases. From no perspective on the timeline is it metaphysically possible for TimnaO to kill TimnaY. 
And it was this feature that made the respective failures in Telephone and Bicycle explicable. If it is 
 
2 If x does not Φ at w, then x’s Φ-ing may not be compossible with the conjunction of w’s laws and 
the set of all pre-t facts at w; especially if w’s laws are deterministic. In that case, we can take can[<t] 
to mean that x Φ-ing is compossible with as many pre-t w-facts as possible, allowing only the 
minimal change/s required for x to Φ at w. 
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not the case that TimnaO merely happens to fail due to causal happenstance, then the question, 
‘what is there to ensure that TimnaO fails?’, still requires answering, and the inexplicability remains. 
4. Contingent Failure Improved  
In both Telephone and Bicycle, we considered whether the agent could have succeeded in his 
or her respective task from a temporal perspective prior to t1, the time of the attempt. Since in both 
cases they could have, the actual failures could be attributed to ordinary contingent causal accident 
and so were deemed explicable. As we will see in a moment with the example Light Switch, however, 
there are some scenarios involving backward causation in which a particular event must be caused to 
occur from a temporal perspective prior to its own occurrence, but where this is still explicable. 
Examples of this kind show that we’ll need to be more precise about the temporal perspective from 
which the occurrence of an event should be contingent if it is to be explicable. 
Suppose there is a switch that, if flipped at t2, makes a light turn on at an earlier time, t0. 
For simplicity we can suppose that the only way for the light to turn on at t0 is for the switch to be 
flipped at t2. Call this scenario Light Switch. One who has all the relevant facts can epistemically 
infer from the light coming on at t0 that the switch will be flipped at t2. Indeed, if the light comes 
on at t0 – still assuming that its cause is the switch being flipped at t2 – then we might be inclined 
to think that at t0 it is already the case that the switch will (have to) be flipped at t2. Given that the 
light has already come on at t0 and that its cause is the switch being flipped at t2, were someone to 
try at t1 to make it such that the switch is not flipped, that person would fail. It seems that they 
would have to fail even before they tried. And yet, I take the (real) lesson of the Lewis-Ismael-Sider 
line to be, in part, that there need be nothing inexplicable about this failure: the failure happens to 
occur at t1, and it is only because it does that the light comes on at t0. Were it not to (happen to) 
occur, the light would not have come on. The reason this failure is explicable is that there is still 
some important sense in which the failure was contingent, even though it already had to occur 
prior to the time of its occurrence at t1. 
 So in what sense did the failure merely happen to occur? I suggest it is this: the switch flipping 
is contingent if the causal effects of the switch flipping are not held fixed. Alternatively, we can express the 
same idea as follows: the switch flipping is contingent from a temporal perspective that is prior to 
both the switch flipping and to all of its causal consequences. Let us suppose that the light turning 
8 
 
on at t0 is the earliest effect of the switch being flipped. In that case, it is possible for the switch to 
not be flipped (and thus, for the light to not turn on) from a temporal perspective that is prior to t0. 
There are nearby possible worlds at which the switch is not flipped at t2 and, because of this, the 
light does not turn on at t0. Because the complete causal chain from the switch flipping to the light 
turning on is contingent, nothing has to be in place to ensure that the switch is flipped at t2. Either 
something happens to make it such that the switch is flipped, in which case the light turns on at t0; 
or not, in which case the light stays off. Our discussion of Light Switch indicates that Contingent Failure 
should be modified in the following way: 
Contingent Failure': Although the attempt in question failed, it was the case from a 
temporal perspective prior to the failure and to its earliest causal consequence that it could have 
succeeded. 
 
Return to Auto-Infanticide. If Ismael is right that Auto-Infanticide is explicable in the way that 
the other cases are, then it should be possible for TimnaO to succeed at killing TimnaY from a 
temporal perspective that is prior to not only TimnaO’s failure to kill TimnaY, but also to the earliest 
causal effects of the failure. TimnaO’s arrival by time travel at t0 is causally downstream from 
TimnaO’s failure to kill TimnaY since, were she to not fail, TimnaO would not be alive nor able to 
time travel to t0. And if that is right, then for Auto-Infanticide to be explicable in the way that Light 
Switch and the others are, it must be the case that TimnaO can succeed at killing TimnaY from a 
temporal perspective that is prior to t0.  If she can[<t0] succeed, then her failure can be attributed to 
ordinary causal happenstance: she happened to fail, and so TimnaO was alive and able to time travel 
to t0. 
 The question, then, is this: can[<t0] TimnaO kill TimnaY? In other words, is it the case that if 
TimnaO fails, it is because she merely happens to? Is the failure contingent from a temporal 
perspective prior to t0? And does TimnaO merely happening to fail thus (partially) account for how 
TimnaO is able to time travel to t0 in the first place? As in Light Switch, we can test the contingency 
of TimnaO’s failure by testing the contingency of the causal chain as a whole. We do this by 
investigating if it is possible to “pick up” the whole chain from the cause – TimnaO’s failure to kill 
TimnaY — to the effect – TimnaO arriving via time machine at t0. If it is the case that TimnaO 
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contingently happens to fail, it should be the case that TimnaO could[<t0] have succeeded at killing 
TimnaY if we allow for the effect of her failure, her time travel to t0, to vary when we vary the cause. 
 When we try to test for contingency we immediately run into a problem, however. If TimnaO 
hadn’t time traveled to t0 she wouldn’t have made the attempt to kill TimnaY in the first place, let 
alone succeeded or failed. What then is indicated by TimnaO’s presence at t0? Does it epistemically 
indicate that she contingently happened to fail, the way the light being on epistemically indicates 
that the switch happened to be flipped? Does it indicate that although she could[<t0] have succeeded, 
she didn’t, and that’s (partly) why she is at t0 – the way that, e.g., Ernie never having a bicycle as a 
child indicates that if ErnieO tried to buy his younger self a bicycle he happened to fail (and that 
failure is partly why he never had a bicycle)? It does not. TimnaO’s presence at t0 does not indicate 
that she contingently happened to fail if she tried to kill TimnaY – i.e., that she happened to slip on 
a banana peel, or the gun happened to jam, etc. – since success would require her to first be at t0 as 
well. Of course, we know that she must fail. It is logically required that she does. The point is that 
her presence at t0 does not indicate that she contingently happens to fail. For the failure to be 
contingent, it must have been possible for it to not have occurred given that most pre-t0 facts are 
held fixed while the failure and its causal consequences are not.3 It must be the case that the agent 
can[<t0] succeed.  
5. Can[<t0] TimnaO kill TimnaY? 
 So can[<t0] TimnaO kill TimnaY? We’ve already seen that TimnaO’s presence at t0 does not 
indicate that she happened to fail to kill TimnaY if she tried, and so the case is already importantly 
different from the others. But from this does it follow that TimnaO cannot[<t0] kill TimnaY? More to 
the point, does it follow that she didn’t contingently happen to fail from a pre-t0 perspective? A bit 
more must be said to answer this question. In particular, its answer depends on whether there are 
already enough facts, pre-t0, to ground TimnaY’s identity to TimnaO. If there are enough such facts, 
then we need not hold fixed post-t0 facts for it to be the case that TimnaO cannot kill TimnaY, and 
 
3 To test for contingency, we hold fixed as many pre-t0 facts as possible because we want to know if the 
respective agent can succeed at the relevant task (buying Ernie a bicycle, killing TimnaY, etc.) at other worlds 
that are just about the same as w prior to t0.  
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the answer to the question in the heading of this section is “no”. I thus turn my attention to the 
following question: 
Q: Is there some pre-t0 fact or set of facts which is sufficient to ground TimnaO’s identity to 
TimnaY? 
The kind of identity at issue here is the kind that would make it such that if TimnaY is 
identical to TimnaO, then the former’s death is inconsistent with the latter’s existence. We can call 
this origination-identity, since TimnaO must originate or emerge out of TimnaY for TimnaY’s death to 
be inconsistent with TimnaO being alive. Which facts ground origination-identity is a difficult 
question. We might appeal to Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis: if TimnaY and TimnaO come from 
the same zygote, then they do so necessarily and the two are origination-identical at all possible 
worlds at which both exist. In that case it makes no difference what happens to Timna at or after t0: 
every world with both TimnaY and TimnaO is a world at which one emerges from the other.4 Since 
they originate from the same zygote by necessity, it is a necessary fact that the two share the same 
origin. And in that case, the answer to Q seems to be yes: TimnaY and TimnaO are origination-
identical, even without holding fixed any facts at or after t0. Because the same individual is rigidly 
designated by “TimnaY” and “TimnaO” – just at different life stages – it is the case from all temporal 
perspectives that the older must fail to kill the younger if she time travels and tries. And if that is 
right, then assuming that TimnaO is older, she does not merely happen to fail at t1. She had to fail, 
even without holding any future facts fixed. (As we’ve seen, it is not open to those endorsing the 
Lewis/Ismael line to reply that had Timnao succeeded then TimnaO wouldn’t exist in the first place, 
and thus that her presence at t0 just proves that she did happen to fail. This is not a good reply since, 
first, TimnaO would also have to first be at t0 in order to succeed and make it such that TimnaY doesn’t 
survive, and anyway, succeeding is itself a contradiction. One who does not exist does not succeed 
at anything.) 
But what if the answer to Q is no? Suppose we adopt a view of identity according to which 
one’s identity, even her origination-identity, is grounded in nothing less than that individual’s entire 
temporally-extended worm. On this view, whether TimnaO is origination-identical to TimnaY at t0 
 
4 Could it be that at some worlds TimnaY is older than TimnaO and originates from her? If so, then at these 
worlds TimnaO can kill TimnaY but TimnaY cannot kill TimnaO. The scenario we are considering is one 
where the older time traveler attempts to kill her younger self.  
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depends, in part, on what happens at and after t1. If there are not enough pre-t0 facts about TimnaO 
and TimnaY to fix whether they are identical, then the explicability can be accounted for as follows: 
nothing needs to stop TimnaO from successfully killing TimnaY. If she happens to be successful, then 
this will make it such that she is origination-identical with a different (actual) younger person, and 
so there will be no logical contradiction.  
Let us momentarily grant the controversial assumptions about identity needed to run this 
line. Still, we confront a serious difficulty. If it is the case that TimnaO can[<t0] kill TimnaY, as is 
required to solve the inexplicability in the way Lewis and Ismael claim to, then it must be the case, 
prior to t0, that there is more than one (younger) person at w who is a candidate for being identical 
with TimnaO. If TimnaY is the only person who is such a candidate, then this strategy for handling 
the apparent inexplicability will not help: it will still be the case, prior to t0, that TimnaO must fail if 
she tries to kill TimnaY. The only way it is possible for her to succeed is if the killing would make it 
such that TimnaO is origination-identical to someone else. But this requires that there be someone 
else alive with whom it is possible for her to be origination-identical, depending on what happens at 
and after t1. And indeed, everyone who might backwards time travel would need to have multiple 
younger people with whom they could stand in the relevant relation of identity, if necessary. This 
may already be weird enough, but it is not only a problem of weirdness: things get worse if we revise 
the scenario. It is not sufficient for there to only be one such additional person with whom each 
person can be identical, for suppose that the time traveler’s scheme involves aiming to kill the 
additional candidate, too. Indeed, let us devise a scenario in which TimnaO’s plan is to travel back 
to t0 and destroy the whole world. Suppose she tries to do this. Suppose 1000 time travelers try to 
do this. It does not matter how advanced the destroy-the-world technology: something would have 
to ensure that at least one (suitable) person survive per each time traveler so that each time traveler 
can be origination-identical with someone. It is logically required that something stop the time 
travelers from succeeding at killing everyone, and so the inexplicability remains.  
There is another possibility to consider. What if there are alternative metaphysically possible 
ways for TimnaO to be present at t0 – ways which do not make it impossible for her to kill TimnaY. 
For example, TimnaO could spontaneously materialize at t0, even if TimnaY dies at t1. Is a possibility 
like this relevant to our discussion? Do we avoid the difficulties if the (only) reason that TimnaO 
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can[<t0] kill TimnaY is that she can, in theory, also arrive at t0 in some way other than by time travel? 
The answer to these questions, I think, is no: possibilities of this kind are not to the point. We can 
begin by noting the intuitive implausibility of such possibilities making a difference here: could it 
really be that backwards time travel is only metaphysically possible in a universe with one-
dimensional time if (and because?) spontaneous materialization (or some suitable alternative) is 
possible, too (since, on the presently-considered proposal, it’s the possibility of an alternative way of 
getting to t0 that can get us out of the problem)? For these very different kinds of potential 
possibilities to be conceptually tied in this way would be extraordinary, on its face. 5  
Indeed, I now argue that the inexplicability is not gotten rid of by bringing in alternative 
ways for TimnaO to get to t0. We can, in fact, set such possibilities aside. Just as worlds at which 
TimnaO attempts to kill someone who turns out to not be origination-identical with herself are not 
the worlds we are concerned with (as long as the successful killing would not itself cause TimnaY to 
be origination-identical with someone else – a possibility we already considered), similarly, worlds at 
which TimnaO happens to arrive at t0 ex nihilo (say) are not of concern. Since we aren’t holding 
post-t0 facts fixed, we need to allow that TimnaO can arrive at t0 ex nihilo. As long as she will not 
always do so, however – that is, as long as she will sometimes arrive at t0 by time travel (we are starting 
with the assumption that time travel is possible, after all), this won’t rid us of the troublesome cases.    
But those are troublesome, my opponent may say, because they are the ones where she is a 
time traveler and so must have survived any earlier attempt on her life: you are holding her survival 
fixed! To see why this reply doesn’t work here, it is important to keep in mind exactly why we are 
trying to hold only pre-t0 facts fixed: we are aiming to determine whether TimnaO’s failure to kill 
TimnaY is contingent in a way that makes the failure explicable. And adding in alternative ways for 
TimnaO to arrive at t0 does not do this, because, for the reasons we’ve already seen, by selecting for 
cases in which she time travels, we are still not selecting for cases in which she contingently happens to 
fail (and so can time travel for that reason). Unless by happy chance TimnaO appears at t0 ex nihilo, 
 
5If my interlocuter remains unconvinced and thinks that a possibility like TimnaO appearing at t0 ex nihilo 
is what solves the inexplicability worry, I’m happy for her to take my argument as a defense of a weaker 
conclusion that backwards time travel is only possible if (and at worlds at which) appearing ex nihilo as a 
fully-grown human – in particular, one who is the older counterpart of a deceased younger individual – is. 
As I’ll argue, I don’t think such a possibility does defuse the worry, but even if it does, it seems to me that 
this weaker conclusion would be sufficiently surprising and interesting in its own right. 
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TimnaY’s survival is antecedently required – not because it contingently happens to occur and we are 
just holding that fixed (that would be explicable!), but rather, because her survival is an enabling 
condition even of successful killing. In other words, even a successful attempt requires failure. Since, 
on pain of contradiction, she can’t both succeed and fail, she has to fail. 6  
When I talk about it being antecedently impossible for TimnaO to succeed, I mean 
antecedently conceptually – the impossibility is conceptually prior to the token failure. It may be 
useful to think of it in terms of the direction of the in-virtue-of relation. It would be perfectly 
explicable, as Telephone and Bicycle are, if the reason that TimnaO had to fail was (i) she contingently 
happened to, and (ii) we are holding that fixed. That is, it’d be explicable if the necessity of the 
failure was in virtue of us holding fixed a contingent failure. But that’s not the situation, here. 
TimnaO did not happen to fail, since her even being in position to succeed would first require failure, 
except in the cases where she happens to appear ex nihilo. (And again, it is not open to my 
interlocutor to reply with, well, if she didn’t appear ex nihilo and didn’t fail in the attempt, she just 
wouldn’t be there at all! Neither a successful nor an unsuccessful attempt could explain her absence.) 
The failure had to occur from the (conceptual) beginning, rather than being in virtue of causal 
happenstance. And if we can’t attribute the presence of the foiling mechanism to mere chance, then, 
that it will be there when needed, i.e., in most cases when TimnaO decides to try to kill TimnaY, 
remains inexplicable. The mere possibility of TimnaO appearing at t0 in ways other than by time 
travel makes no difference to this: it is the possibility of backwards time travel itself that gives rise to 
the problem. 7 
 
6 Note that this is not the case if it is anyone else trying to kill TimnaY. If it is Tom, rather than TimnaO, 
trying to kill TimnaY, then success is possible from a pre-t0 perspective, since failure is not an enabling 
condition for that success. 
7 An anonymous referee brought up another possibility I had not considered. Could not the younger 
person who is origination-identical with TimnaO, or who is at least a candidate for being such, come from 
the future rather than from the past? In that case it would not be logically impossible for TimnaO to kill 
TimnaY, nor even for her to kill everyone alive at t1: if she succeeded, this would just mean that TimnaO’s 
earlier self came from the future (assuming that TimnaO did not appear at t0 ex nihilo). I see a few problems 
with this as a potential solution. First, it is not clear to me that it even counts as backwards time travel if 
Timna’s own personal timeline goes from the future-to-past direction. Her traveling to t0 is then just 
moving in the same temporal direction from which she came. We may decide that this doesn’t count as 
backwards time travel, and set the scenario aside. 
Second, putting the first reply aside, it needs to be the case that the person TimnaO kills at t1 was, 
at least immediately prior to her death, also a candidate for being the younger Timna. Otherwise, the 
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Let me be clear that I agree with Lewis and Ismael that, like in Telephone and Bicycle, in 
Autoinfanticide the failure is already built into the description of the class of cases considered. That 
TimnaO is alive and able to time travel to t0 entails that TimnaY survived to adulthood. Crucially, 
however, unlike Telephone and Bicycle, in Autoinfanticide the failure that is built in is itself an 
inexplicable failure. It is not merely built in that TimnaO does fail, the way that it is built in that 
Ismael and Ernie do. It is built in that she has to fail, because, in most circumstances, failure is an 
enabling condition even of her success. Since it is built in that something must go wrong, and not 
merely that something does, we cannot defuse the question, what will enforce the presence of some foiling 
mechanism should time-traveling Timna choose to attempt autoinfanticide?, in the way that analogous 
questions regarding the other failures can be defused.  
 Let us take stock. So far I have argued that if Auto-Infanticide is explicable, it is not for the 
reason that Telephone, Bicycle or Light Switch are. It is not the case that time-traveling TimnaO is at t0 
and in position to kill TimnaY only because she contingently happens to be caused to fail at t1. 
Instead, the situation seems to be this. If TimnaO is a time traveler and tries to kill TimnaY then she 
 
scenario is not one of attempted self-killing. But now things get complicated. Is TimnaO’s personal causal 
history at the moment she arrives at t0 from the future or is it from the past? Since there is no branching 
time, it cannot be both. If her younger self comes from the future, then the young person at t0 is not the 
real TimnaY  - i.e., the one who is origination-identical to TimnaO. And if TimnaO’s younger self comes from 
the past, then the potential solution does not apply. So just before t0 it must be the case that TimnaO can 
be origination-identical with two different younger people, one of whom is in the past (i.e., the person we’ve 
been calling “TimnaY”), and one who is in the future. The “can” here is not merely an epistemic can: it 
must be metaphysically indeterminate, shortly before t1, whether TimnaO is origination-identical with a 
younger person from the future or with one from the past. That means, it must be indeterminate from 
where her causal history lies. Indeed, she must have no determinate causal history. From where do her 
memories come from, then? The past of t1? The future of t1? Is it metaphysically possible, without 
branching time, for an individual at a time to have no determinate causal history?  It is hard to conceive of 
how. 
Even if it is metaphysically possible for it to be indeterminate, at a time, from which temporal 
direction an individual’s causal history up to that time comes from, we can put such cases aside in the way 
that we have put to the side cases where TimnaO appears at t0 ex nihilo. All we need to get the problem off 
the ground is for there to be some possible worlds at which backwards time travel is possible (at those 
worlds), but at which at least some individuals are not such that the direction of their causal history is 
indeterminate (or else, who do not have younger individuals who are candidates to be origination-identical 
to themselves both in the past and in the future). If backwards time travel is possible in these cases, the 
problem will remain. (Just as before, by putting these cases to the side and focusing on ordinary time-travel 




is in a causal loop: her failure to kill TimnaY at t1 is a cause of her living long enough to get in a time 
machine at t2, which in turn is a cause of her arriving at t0 and being in position to try to kill TimnaY 
at t1. If this causal loop gets started at all, TimnaO has to fail. What’s more, it is not the case that her 
happening to fail makes the loop start: once she is in the position to make the attempt, the loop has 
already started and there is no possibility of success. Nor is it the case that some other event causally 
upstream from her failure happens to occur which itself causally necessitates the failure. Other key 
events on the causal chain include TimnaO getting in her time machine and arriving in the past at 
t0.  Although these events are on the causal chain leading to the failure, they do not (causally) 
necessitate it. Indeed, they are causally compatible with her success. It is the additional event, the slip 
on the banana peel or the jamming of the gun, that makes TimnaO fail rather than succeed. And so 
far we have found nothing to make explicable the apparently inexplicable fact that an event of this 
kind will somehow be caused to occur every time a time traveler travels back in time and attempts 
to kill her own earlier self.  
6. Contradiction as Explanation? 
  I have argued that the Lewis-Ismael-style reply to the inexplicability objection is unsuccessful. 
But there is another kind of reply to the objection to consider. Perhaps it need not be the case that 
the failure merely happens to occur by contingent causal happenstance for the failure to be 
explicable. Perhaps it is enough for explicability simply that there are no worlds at which the time 
traveler tries to kill her younger self and succeeds. There may be worlds at which there are causal 
loops involving time travelers trying and failing to kill their infant selves, and worlds at which people 
appear in the past in ways other than by time travel and then kill their infant selves. But we can all 
agree that, given our starting assumption that time is one-dimensional, there are no worlds at which 
time travelers travel to the past and kill their younger selves. So, the defender of time traveler might 
say, since it follows that every world at which a time traveler travels back in time and tries to kill her 
younger self is a world at which she will fail, nothing more needs to be said by way of explication.  
Nicholas J. J. Smith (1997) pursues this strategy for deflating the apparent inexplicability. He 
does so by distinguishing explicable from inexplicable kinds of failures in general, and then arguing 
that the time traveler’s failure to kill her younger self falls into the explicable category. To illustrate 
the difference between explicable and inexplicable failures Smith offers the following examples: 
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failing to enter your kitchen – “when you try to do so it’s as if you run into a glass wall” – despite 
the fact that your neighbor with an identical floor plan has no problem entering hers (inexplicable) 
vs. forgetting you have no attic and then always failing to enter the (nonexistent) attic for what 
appears to you to be some strange conspiracy to prevent you from entering your attic (explicable); 
searching for an existing fountain of youth but something or other always stops you from finding it 
despite generally having no problem finding other things you look for (inexplicable) vs. there is no 
fountain of youth and every attempt made to find it ends in failure for some reason or another 
(explicable); a barber sets out to shave someone and continuously fails for various reasons 
(inexplicable) vs. a barber in Newcastle fails each time he sets out to shave all and only the barbers 
in Newcastle who do not shave themselves (explicable).  
 According to Smith, the key difference between the explicable and inexplicable failures is the 
following: 
In both types, one invariably fails to enact a scenario satisfying a certain description (e.g., “entering 
the attic,” “finding the fountain of youth,” “shaving all and only those who do not shave themselves”). 
In one type of case – the one where failure demands an explanation – there are contextually relevant 
possible scenarios satisfying the description. In the other type of case, there are not…Hence, there is 
no question of explaining why “such scenarios” are not actualized. Beyond pointing out that there 
simply are no such scenarios – so whatever happens, one of “them” will not be actualized – there is 
nothing more to say by way of explanation of the barber’s failure. (1997: 160) 
 
It is easy to see how this is supposed to defuse the inexplicability worry. The time traveler’s failure 
to kill her infant self falls into the explicable category: “This is a case of the type in which no (further) 
explanation of failure is required. There are no scenarios at all – no points in logical space – satisfying 
the description “a time traveler commits autoinfanticide…Whatever happens, it won’t be 
autoinfanticide because no scenario at all satisfies that description.” (1997: 161-162)  
 The problem with this reply is that what makes the scenario seem so inexplicable is that 
something apparently has to be in place to cause the time traveler to fail (she slips on a banana peel, 
etc.). This differs from Smith’s examples, and from other examples involving logical impossibility. 
In general, logical impossibility is contained in itself: it does not work through things or events that 
are external to it. For example, the reason that the barber cannot shave all and only those barbers 
who do not shave themselves is that as soon as he shaves all he has not shaven only, but if he shaves 
only he does not shave all. Nothing needs to stop the barber from succeeding. He need not trip on 
a banana peel, or get worn out, or forget to bring his razor.  
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 Or consider the painter who desires to make a chair simultaneously red and green all over. 
If she tries, she will fail. She will fail because for it to be red all over is already, by itself, for it to not 
be green all over, and vice versa. Her failure will not be due to her slipping on a banana peel or 
carrying with her the wrong paints. (In my view it does not even make sense to speak as though the 
cause of her failure is an event of this type.) This is why the time traveler’s failure is inexplicable in 
the way that the barber’s or the painter’s isn’t. Something must stop the time traveler from 
committing auto infanticide. And logic does not “work through” causation to enforce itself in this 
way. That is just not the kind of thing that logic is. 
 What is explicable, in Smith’s sense, is that the time traveler is not both alive and dead at 
any one time. As soon as one is dead, one is not alive, and vice versa. But that is as far as the 
explicability goes. For something to have to happen to cause it to be the case that she is alive rather 
than dead at t1 (even if being dead at t1 would result in a logical contradiction) remains inexplicable.  
 We can see the problem in a different way. Let us consider one last example. It has been 
proven to be impossible to trisect an arbitrary angle using only a compass and a straight-edge.8 Sam 
is attempting to do just that. Since the task is impossible, Sam will fail. As with the impossibilities 
discussed before, what is impossible is some particular combination of states of affairs. It is impossible 
for Timna to be both alive and not alive at a time. It is impossible for a chair to be both red all over 
and green all over at a time. And it is impossible for Sam to use only a compass and straight-edge, 
and to successfully trisect the angle. There is no possible world at which Sam succeeds by using only 
these tools. But the fact that there is no such world cannot explain which of the set of mutually 
inconsistent states of affairs fails to occur at a given world. Which does must have a causal 
explanation. Another way to put this is that the logical explanandum is disjunctive: it is required that 
either Sam fail in his attempt or that he come up with additional tools to work with (say). Now, in 
this example, like in the previous ones, there is nothing problematic about supposing that which 
disjunct obtains is explained by ordinary causal happenstance. Indeed, even if it is part of the 
description of the scenario that Sam has only a compass and a straight-edge, we have no problem 
assuming that there is a contingent causal explanation for why he has only these tools. And, given 
 
8 I thank an anonymous referee for this example. 
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that he does, there is a logical/mathematical explanation for why he will fail in his attempt. So the 
scenario is explicable. 
 In Auto-Infanticide, in contrast, not only is it the case that TimnaY cannot be both dead and 
alive at t1 (explicable); it is also the case that she must be alive rather than dead at that time. But logic 
is not in the business of accounting for which of the inconsistent states she is in.  The absence of 
possible worlds at which she is both alive and not alive cannot explain why she is alive at a world, 
on its own. This is problematic when conjoined with the fact that TimnaO must fail even when we 
don’t hold post-t0 facts fixed. 9 That is, it is not because TimnaY happens to survive past t1 that 
Timnao must fail – in the way that Sam must fail only because he happens to have just one compass 
and a straight-edge. We saw that there is nothing contingent about TimnaY’s survival, even from a 
pre-t0 perspective. Since (i) the absence of possible worlds at which a given set of mutually 
inconsistent states of affairs obtains cannot explain why one of those states of affairs is actualized 
rather than the other, and since (ii) causal happenstance cannot explain it in this case, either, Smith’s 
proposal fails to explicate how something will always be in place to stop the time traveler.10 
6. Auto-Infanticide and Program and Process Explanations 
 Let us try to be more precise about exactly what it is that is still in need of explication. 
Consider the following questions: 
Q1: Why must TimnaO fail? 
Q2: Why does TimnaO fail? 
In a recent article Baron and Colyvan (2016) argue that by attending to the distinction between 
program and process explanations sometimes made in the literature about extra-mathematical 
 
9 If it is preferred, instead of talking about TimnaY, we can talk about the set of individuals who are 
candidates for being numerically identical with TimnaO given only facts about TimnaO at t0. We can make 
just the same point using them: they can either all survive or not all survive – logic is not in the business of 
deciding which of these two states occurs. And yet, it is not contingent which happens, either: at least one 
must survive. By speaking about the set who are candidates for being identical with TimnaO instead of about 
TimnaY, we ensure that we don’t sneak in post-t0 facts about Timna’s identity, regardless of if we hold a 
metaphysical view about identity according to which origination-identity is grounded in nothing less than 
the individual’s entire temporally-extended worm (thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this).   
10 Of course, exactly how TimnaY’s life is saved may be a contingent matter (does TimnaO slip on a banana 
peel, does her gun jam?) but that she must be saved, even when we don’t hold fixed post-t0 facts, is not. 
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explanations, we can find a satisfying answer to questions like Q1 and Q2. And if that is so, they 
say, then there is nothing else in need of explication. Process explanations appeal to the actual causes 
that resulted in the explanandum in question. In contrast, a “higher-level”, non-causal program 
explanation “abstract[s] away from, or otherwise ignore[s], the causal details…the program 
explanation can explain why a particular explanandum must be the case (for the appropriate 
modality), as opposed to why it is the case de facto.” (2018: 64) For instance, a process explanation 
for why your attempt to fit the square peg through the round hole as a matter of fact failed would 
appeal to the particular causal processes involved: e.g., a particular part of the peg collides with a 
particular part of the board. A program explanation for why you must fail appeals to the geometric 
properties of the squareness of the peg and the roundness of the hole, e.g., the roundness of the 
hole and the squareness of the peg ensures that each time you try to force the peg through the hole 
some part or other will get in the way. (2018: 65) Similarly, Baron and Colyvan maintain that in the 
case of the grandfather paradox (or Auto-Infanticide) there is a satisfying answer to both Q1 and Q2; 
and that is all we need for explicability. In any given instance in which TimnaO tries and fails to kill 
TimnaY there will be a process (causal) explanation for what as a matter of fact stops TimnaO from 
killing TimnaY in that instance: e.g., perhaps the gun jams. There will be, in addition, a program 
explanation for why TimnaO must fail to kill TimnaY: if TimnaO were to succeed, she would bring 
about a logical contradiction, which is impossible.  
The problem is that Q1, as it is written, is ambiguous. Is the question, why must[<t0] TimnaO 
fail, or is it, why must[∞] TimnaO fail? The program and process explanations can conjointly explain 
the second but not the first. We’ve seen that logic alone gets us only that it is not the case that Timna 
is both alive and not alive at a time. On its own logic cannot explain Timna being alive rather than 
dead at a time (or vice versa), nor her surviving (or not surviving) an attempt on her life. For the 
program explanation to explain why TimnaO must fail in her attempt, we need the additional fact 
that TimnaY does as a matter of fact survive. But, as I’ve argued, TimnaY’s survival does not occur 
only as a matter of fact. If the attacker is TimnaO, then TimnaY must survive, even from a pre-t0 
perspective. And it is this – that there must be a banana peel (or equivalent) even when we don’t hold 
fixed that TimnaY survives the attempt – that the program and process explanations cannot account for. 
The program explanation can account for the fact that there will be something or other in place – a 
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banana peel or a jammed gun – only given that TimnaY survives the attempt. The program 
explanation must already take TimnaY’s survival for granted (otherwise it can tell us only that she 
cannot both survive and not survive): it cannot explain it. And the process explanation lacks the 
required modal robustness to explain the fact that the banana peel (or the like) not only happens to 
be there but must be there. 
7. Conclusion 
We’ve seen that in Auto-Infanticide we have an additional fact – TimnaO must[<t0] fail – to 
account for. What makes the scenario inexplicable is that the banana peel or suitable alternative 
must be caused to be there if TimnaO tries to kill TimnaY. In particular, it is not the case that the 
banana peel happens to be there and that this explains how Timna is able to live long enough to later 
time travel to t0 (if that were the case, the banana peel’s presence would be explicable).  If the banana 
peel (or its alternative) doesn’t merely happen to be there, what can ensure that it is there if TimnaO 
tries to kill TimnaY? Perhaps the forces of logic must stay TimnaO’s hand after all.  Alternatively, if 
we are unprepared to accept that logic can be the kind of thing to enforce itself through causation 
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